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ABSTRACT
QEYSSat (Quantum EncrYption and Science Satellite) is a proposed microsatellite mission concept under
development for the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) that will demonstrate long-distance quantum key distribution
(QKD) from space. Under the leadership of principal investigator Dr. Thomas Jennewein of the University of
Waterloo’s Institute for Quantum Computing (IQC) and in partnership with the Institut National d’Optique (INO),
the University of Toronto Space Flight Laboratory (UTIAS/SFL) and the Neptec Design Group, COM DEV has
advanced the QEYSSat mission concept over the last two years through a series of technical studies funded initially
by Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC) and subsequently by the CSA.
QKD is a highly secure method of creating an encryption key between two remote parties using the exchange of
individual photons. Current terrestrial quantum key networks employ optical fiber links for the photon exchange.
The most important attribute of keys generated and distributed in this manner is the security of the method. In
theory, QKD is impervious to eavesdropping because under the laws of quantum mechanics the properties of an
individual photon cannot be measured without impacting its state. Any eavesdropping can therefore be detected,
allowing a quantitative measurement of the security of the generated key.
The principal shortcoming of this method is that single-photon exchange processes are necessary for the
implementation of a QKD network, which requires either line-of-sight between the network nodes or the use of lowloss optical fiber. This line-of-sight requirement restricts distances due to the curvature of the Earth, and optical
fiber is limited to distances of about 200 km due to losses. There is no way to implement a “repeater” or amplifier
in the link because this would impact the state of the photon and essentially defeat the inherent anti-eavesdropping
characteristics of the technique.
Using satellites as nodes in the QKD network would overcome this distance limitation and allow keys to be
distributed over much larger distances. QEYSSat will demonstrate QKD from space, providing insight into singlephoton link behavior and also serving as a platform for fundamental quantum physics experimentation. The
proposed mission is currently baselined to use the AIM (Advanced Integrated Microsatellite) bus developed by
COM DEV for M3MSat (Maritime Monitoring and Messaging Micro-Satellite). AIM is a responsive, flexible and
cost-effective platform that meets or exceeds the CSA’s Multi-Mission Microsatellite Bus (MMMB) specification.
The proposed QEYSSat spacecraft would carry a quantum payload designed to measure the polarization of
individual photons. It would operate in conjunction with dedicated ground stations that will transmit the polarized
photons. The payload is expected to have the capability to generate the quantum keys and manage their distribution
between distant ground stations.
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This paper will describe the proposed QEYSSat mission concept and summarize the development work to date. A
successful demonstration of QKD from space could pave the way for the future development of secure global
quantum networks for users in both government and the private sector.

keys. Using trusted nodes in ground systems is possible
but requires a very large number of nodes to connect
two distant users. Using satellites as trusted nodes will
enable arbitrarily large separation of QKD, which is
virtually impossible on ground.

INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics offers communication with an
unprecedented level of security based on entangled
photon states or on other signals exhibiting quantum
mechanical properties, as in the polarization states of
single photons. The security originates in the fact that,
in contrast to classical information, quantum
information cannot be copied without disturbing the
quantum state. Any attempt to obtain knowledge about
the information content of a signal will perturb the
quantum state carrying the information.
One
application of these principles is the secure distribution
of data encryption keys using individual photons. Such
transmission methods are impervious to eavesdropping,
and this is ensured by the laws of quantum mechanics –
there is no way to circumvent this principle.
Encryption keys can be securely distributed to
individual users using quantum methods and the end
user can then make use of their unique keys to
communicate via standard methods (cipher encryption).

A system designed to demonstrate space-based
quantum key distribution is fundamentally a quantum
link that can be used for a variety of purposes. The link
itself will be fully characterized and optimized, and
thus can also be used for other science experiments, in
particular, the verification of the non-locality of
quantum mechanics by demonstration of quantum
entanglement over large distances.
Quantum
entanglement is of fundamental relevance to quantum
physics, yet can only be tested at relatively short (< 200
km) distances terrestrially.
The satellite mission
proposed here will provide the world’s first long
distance entanglement test, with entangled particles
separated by over 600 km. While the scientific
opportunities in this QKD mission are somewhat more
limited than in other missions that have been considered
specifically for science-only applications, the simplicity
of this mission allows aspects of these science
experiments to be achieved much sooner and at a lower
cost, while at the same time providing a demonstration
mission of space based QKD. This mission will also
lower the risk for future bigger, more complex, science
missions that could follow, and will provide a
sufficiently long mission life so that QKD can be
operationally demonstrated.
The satellite can
potentially be used to distribute keys in an operational
service, providing a degree of utility as well as a long
term test bed for future scientific investigations and
collaborations.

Figure 1: Key exchange
While terrestrial quantum networks exist to distribute
keys, the distance over which one can successfully
perform quantum key distribution (QKD) is currently
limited because of the exponential transmission losses
experienced in optical fiber, and because a quantum
signal cannot be amplified without disturbing the
quantum state (no-cloning theorem 1). Future prospects
for low-loss fiber are also not likely to yield significant
improvement over the next several decades. One way
to overcome this barrier is through the use of trusted
nodes at intermediate points between users: a key is
exchanged between a user A and the trusted node, and
user B and the trusted node. The trusted node then
connects the two users, using its full knowledge of both
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The development of this quantum key distribution
demonstration mission follows a nine month feasibility
study, during which a long list of potential quantum
space missions was evaluated and down selected to two
potential mission proposals. These two proposals, a
double-entangled link science experiment and this QKD
demonstration mission, were developed in more detail
in order to demonstrate the concept feasibility and
evaluate their relative merits. The current QKD
mission was therefore selected after significant
consideration of the possible applications of quantum
mechanics that could be served only with a space
segment. Specific reasons for the development of this
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QKD mission included the multiuse aspect – this
mission demonstrates the application of QKD, but can
also be used for science experiments – and the relative
simplicity of the proposed microsatellite concept. An
important quality is also the shorter development
timeline for quantum physics experiments in space.

best security bounds available. This key must also be
exchanged with a second ground station in order to
demonstrate the global key distribution concept
required of this mission. To achieve the science goals,
sufficient link quality and timing alignment is crucial.
A Core Users Team has been formed to formally define
the mission objectives and the mission success criteria
have been identified. This team currently consists of
Science Users, and representatives from Defense
Research and Development Canada, and the
Communications Security Establishment Canada.
These users and representatives have guided the
development and scope of this mission.

The configuration for this mission is to create a single
quantum link from a photon source on the ground to
polarization detectors on a satellite in low Earth orbit.
This was selected during the feasibility study as the best
configuration to achieve a quantum key exchange
between space and ground, after careful consideration
of uplinks, downlinks, and alternate orbit altitudes. In
addition to the simplification of the required payload,
this configuration has the advantage of allowing various
photon sources to be used/tested on the ground. A
recommended weak coherent laser pulse source can
also be added to the satellite, to allow studies of both
the uplink and downlink transmission directions (the
atmospheric interaction of the link is different for up
and down links), and to provide space heritage for a
photon source.

It is clear that countries worldwide are ramping up to
perform their own QKD space experiments and Canada
is interested especially due to the world leading
research currently underway in Canada in the area of
Quantum Communications and Quantum Computing.
System Overview
To securely distribute encryption keys anywhere on the
globe, the satellite will act as a ‘trusted node,’ meaning
that the keys will be held/stored on the satellite during
operations, and that the security of the satellite is
assumed. The satellite will create a secure key between
itself and ground station A during one or more passes.
It will also create a secure key between itself and
ground station B during one or more passes. Then to
create a secure key between station A and station B, a
Boolean combination of the two keys is calculated on
the satellite. The result is transmitted (classically and in
the open) to one of the two ground stations. Using the
combined key and the knowledge of its own key, a
station can then calculate the other station’s key, and
use it for secure communications between station A and
B.

MISSION OVERVIEW
Mission Objectives
The objective of the proposed mission is to create a
quantum link between ground and space using
polarized photons and to generate encryption keys for
ground based users using this link. These keys can be
used to re-key the satellite itself, or distributed to one or
more ground stations, with the QKD satellite acting as
the trusted node as described in the previous section. In
achieving this goal, the quantum link will be measured
and tested to gain insights into such things as the
applicability of different types of photon sources and
transmission schemes. The satellite will be used for
concurrent scientific experiments with the long distance
quantum link. Of particular interest are tests of the
quantum mechanics of pairs of entangled photons, with
one photon remaining on ground and one being sent to
the satellite. The insights that may be gained from this
demonstration mission will provide information and
risk mitigation strategies relevant to future missions,
both application and science oriented.

A single ground station is sufficient to demonstrate the
quantum link and the key creation process; however,
two ground stations are proposed in order to have a
realistic demonstration of key distribution between
distant locations. Using multiple ground stations also
extends the opportunities available to experimentalists,
with respect to measurement opportunities, quantum
sources, and environmental (clear sky) conditions, and
invites global collaboration.

For successful quantum key distribution, quantum
signals must be received with a low enough error rate to
exclude an eavesdropper, and with large enough photon
numbers to account for statistical fluctuations. Success
for a single key generation requires a full QKD protocol
which includes timing analysis, basis reconciliation,
error correction, and privacy amplification.
The
application of the protocol must return a nonzero key
transfer rate over a single satellite passage using the
D’Souza, I. et al

The proposed system is based on a quantum photon
uplink from ground to the satellite, in order to minimize
the complexity of the spacecraft. The quantum source
will be at the ground station, which will allow for
flexibility and future upgrades. This source is expected
to be either a weak coherent pulse (WCP) laser source
or an entangled photon source which generates
3
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entangled photon pairs from a laser. Different types of
sources can be used at different ground stations, but
having at least one entangled photon source is
important for scientific experiments. The satellite will
carry the photon polarization detectors, and encryption
key management software. Additionally, a weak
coherent pulse source is proposed to be carried on
board the satellite. It would not be used for QKD, but
would maximize the scientific benefit of the mission by
providing vital information on the quantum optical
down-link path, as well as providing flight heritage for
the hardware.
Crucial systems for this mission include laser beacon
sources and receivers, at both ends, for link acquisition
and
tracking,
polarization
monitoring
and
compensation, and fine pointing for the quantum link.
A clock alignment process for the precise time tagging
of photons is also essential. In addition to quantum
communication, classical communication of non-secure
information is required for the key exchange; this will
be performed using standard RF links.

4.

Alice and Bob perform many rounds of this
distribution until enough raw signals have
been detected by Bob to meet the necessary
security conditions (usually around 106
photons).

5.

Bob then sends Alice his list of time-tags so
that she can filter her list down to only those
events which Bob received. This is called the
Raw Key.

6.

Each laser intensity, µ and µdecoy, have
certain photon number statistics. Alice checks
to make sure that the measured statistics match
the theoretical ones closely enough to assure
security.

7.

Bob sends Alice a list of the bases he used for
each of his measurements. Alice sifts her list
down to only those results where she encoded
her bit in the same basis that Bob measured.
She also sends this index list to Bob so that he
can also sift his results. This is called the
Sifted Key.

8.

Since the channel and QKD system itself will
likely have errors, Alice and Bob perform
error reconciliation on their sifted keys to
correct these errors. The most efficient
algorithm is for them to use a one-way low
density parity check (LDPC) error correction
algorithm. Here Bob calculates syndrome
information on his key and sends this to Alice.
Alice then performs a maximum likelihood
routine in order to correct her key given the
syndrome information. This is called the Error
Corrected Key.

9.

The error correction algorithm also gives Alice
and Bob the exact quantum bit error rate
(QBER) experienced during their quantum
transmission. Using the secure key generation
formula from the proof of security for QKD,
they calculate how much final secure key that
they can generate.

Key Exchange
Since the satellite is purely a quantum receiver, the
protocol used to realize the QKD mission depends on
the quantum source: BB842 for a WCP and decoy
states, or BBM923 for an entangled photon source.
The following descriptions of each protocol use the
names Alice and Bob for the source and receiver, as is
common in physics and cryptography. For this mission,
Alice is the source on ground and Bob is the receiver on
the spacecraft.
BB84 was the original QKD protocol developed which
later was augmented with the idea of decoy states in
order to assure security for longer transmission
distances. It has the following steps:
1.

Alice randomly chooses three parameters for
each quantum: a basis to encode in (H/V or
+45°/-45°), a bit value (0/1), and a laser
intensity (µ/µdecoy).

2.

Using the selected laser intensity Alice
encodes her photon with the chosen basis and
bit value and sends it over the free-space
channel to Bob; at the same time Alice saves a
list of all of the parameters for each photon
sent.

10. Alice and Bob each perform privacy
amplification on their error corrected keys
which reduces their key size to that calculated
in the previous step and ensures security. This
is called the Final Secure Key.

Bob receives the photon and randomly chooses
one of the two bases (H/V or +45°/-45°) to
measure the photon in. He records the basis,
the result of the measurement, and the arrival
time of the photon (time-tag list).

11. Alice and Bob can now use this secure key to
encrypt their communications between each
other. Or Alice can wait until the satellite
establishes a key with a second ground station,
for example Charlie. Once Bob and Charlie

3.
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share a secure key, Bob on the satellite can
compute the XOR of the two keys and provide
it (non-securely) to Charlie. Charlie can then
recover the key shared by the satellite and
Alice and use it to securely communicate with
Alice, thus accomplishing secure global QKD.
This scenario is called the trusted node
scenario since the satellite must be a trusted
node because it holds a copy of each key.

detections, similar to what is recorded on the satellite.
For a WCP, the data consists of time tags and bits of
data. The data consists of bits to indicate the pulse
intensity and polarization.
Nominally, the payload data will be transferred to
ground during the pass used for the quantum link. A
ground station used for the key exchange is expected to
have the classical communications equipment on site.
If the processing is not completed during a single pass,
or an RF link is not available on site, key creation is
still possible but additional delays will occur. In
particular, ground stations without RF links can be used
for science objectives, with the payload data
downlinked to an alternative location. If the time tags
need to be stored for later download, sufficient storage
space is required on board. If they are transmitted to
ground in real time during the key exchange, a
sufficient buffer is required but only the bits
(polarizations) need to be stored in memory.

The other possibility to perform QKD is to use a source
of entangled photons in order to distribute the secure
key. The BBM92 protocol essentially symmetrizes the
BB84 protocol. Security in the entangled scheme relies
on the fact that correlations in two bases are only
possible with a particular quantum mechanical
correlation and any eavesdropper would ruin that
correlation. So Alice and Bob in this case do not need a
decoy step.
Payload Data

In an operational system, the data from intermediate
steps can be deleted once the Final Secure Key is
created. However, multiple passes may be needed to
collect a sufficient number of photons for the final key,
in which case intermediate storage is still required. In
this mission all data will be optionally stored for later
downlink.

Raw data acquired from the quantum link consists of
time tagged polarization measurements.
The
polarization and measurement basis bit are arbitrarily
defined, but Table 1 provides an example for clarity.
For a secure key exchange, only the times and the
measurement bases can be communicated to ground,
along with the information from key processing steps as
described above. However, the demonstration/science
aspect of this mission implies more data will be
available on ground than would normally be collected
in an operational QKD scenario.
For science
experiments the detected polarizations will be included
in the raw data transferred to ground for analysis.

The final destination of the secure encryption key is
local to the ground station. Once received on ground,
the key is considered delivered. Local operators are
responsible for encrypting and de-encrypting
communication using the secure key.
Concept of Operations

Table 1: Example of Raw Data Definitions
Measurement

Basis Bit

Polarization Bit

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

The satellite will be placed in a sun-synchronous orbit,
at approximately 600 km altitude. This is the nominal
orbit used for all the mission analysis, but a link
analysis can be calculated for other similar orbits, once
launch opportunities are identified. However, the
payload can only function when both the satellite and
ground station are dark. Depending on the ground
station location, two to three dark passes will be
possible per night, but only passes with clear skies can
be used. The satellite will be designed for a two year
lifetime with no propulsion capabilities. The two year
lifetime is selected somewhat arbitrarily, as a
reasonable design lifetime for a microsatellite class bus.
This also provides sufficient time for in-orbit
debugging, science testing various sources, and
analyzing and optimizing the quantum link.

The amount of data generated on board is slightly
different depending on the source type. The amount of
raw data required to generate a secure key is slightly
different as well, due to the differences in the key
exchange protocols.

Planning will be done at COM DEV, interacting with
each optical ground station to determine weather and
conditions for seeing. Planning initially will consist of

The data stored on ground depends on the source type.
For an entangled source, it is time tagged photon
D’Souza, I. et al
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trial transmissions during a commissioning phase to
allow for calibration and performance characterization
of the various signal detection systems, including
pointing and tracking.

Tracking and link maintenance ~ 400
seconds

direction of
motion

Initial Pointing
and
Acquisition
~ 100
seconds
`

Loss of link

Accessibility cone

After commissioning and satellite characterization, the
main QKD and science activity can take place. In
normal operations, when the satellite is in daylight, it
can be oriented to maximize power generation, while
protecting its optical systems from the sun. As it
approaches a ground station, it will slew to point the
tracking beacon towards where the ground station will
appear on the horizon. The beacon from ground will be
detected by the on-board tracking system in order to
maintain the optical link with the ground station
throughout the pass. The single photon quantum link
will be acquired and the initiation of the quantum
protocol will begin. The resulting data will nominally
be downlinked to a collocated RF station, or
alternatively be stored for later downlink to an offsite
station. The pass will automatically terminate if the
ground beacon is lost and not reacquired after a set
delay.

Visibility cone

LET

Figure 2: Target acquisition, pointing and tracking
The ADCS will utilise star trackers for high accuracy
and high bandwidth attitude pointing knowledge and
reaction wheels for quick slewing and high bandwidth
control.
Other hardware includes sun sensors,
magnetometer and GPS receiver for attitude
determination and autonomous spacecraft position
estimation, and torquers for satellite momentum
dumping and crude control. The beacon receiver on the
telescope, though decoupled from the ADCS, is an
integral part of the APT concept as it dictates the
pointing accuracy requirements for the ADCS.

Potential Launcher
Using the COM DEV AIM class microsatellite bus as
an example, it is designed to be compatible with Delta
IV, Rockot, Dnepr, Falcon 1e, Taurus, Vega, and PSLV
launchers. However, the secondary mirror of the
receiver telescope may extend outside of the AIM bus
target volume envelope. This means that Delta IV and
Vega launchers will need to be considered on a case by
case basis. The other launchers listed provide a larger
volume envelope, so should accept the extension
without issue. Further constraints may be identified in
the next phase of this project, in particular for the shock
and vibration of the telescope and optical path.

The following baseline parameters are assumed for the
definition of the system:
1.

Circular, Sun synchronous orbit with an altitude of
600 km.

2.

Average effective pass duration: 400 s

3.

Satellite moment of inertia of 15 kg•m2 (AIM
Class bus)

4.

Beacon receiver FOV of ±0.3°

5.

Spacecraft beacon transmitter FOV of ±0.3 °

MISSION SPECIFIC OPERATIONS
Fine Beam Steering Optics

Acquisition Pointing and Tracking (APT)

The main function of the fine steering system is to
provide the final fine correction of the quantum signal
focusing onto the quantum detectors to correct for the
following factors:
(a) Limitations in the satellite attitude control system to
provide precise pointing of the optical systems.
(b) Correct any misalignment between the payload and
the spacecraft (isolation mounts).

Figure 2 shows the sequence required for transferring
quantum information between the satellite and the
groundstation. In anticipation of the pass, the satellite
slews to point towards the ground station. When it
comes into view, the satellite transmits its beacon and
tracks the ground station accurately enough to maintain
the beacon target on the fine pointing detector. The
ground station also illuminates its beacon, and tracks
the satellite. At the end of the pass, the payload powers
down, and the ADCS returns to a stand-by mode.

D’Souza, I. et al

One of the principal requirements of any fine steering
optics is that it maintains the integrity of the quantum
signal. Since polarization of the photons must be
accounted for, any optical design must be constrained
to either maintain polarization, or accurately account
for any potential changes. The current design proposed
6
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by COM DEV will ensure this requirement. The APT
subsystem on the satellite tracks the ground station
optical transmitters with sufficient accuracy, precision,
and speed to accumulate enough single photons for a
credible demonstration of QKD.
As such, an
apportionment of the pointing and tracking tasks is
allocated between the ground station, the spacecraft
bus, and the APT fine tracking control. Each of these
plays a role to ensure the maximum successful photon
exchange.
Initial studies have provided the analysis to size the
APT subsystem to meet the user requirements. With
the requirements met, the pointing and tracking optical
subsystem is expected to have a mass just over 3 kg,
power requirements under 12 W average and about 20
W peak, and fit in a volume of 28x20x11 cm3.
In the current design, the APT subsystem is not coupled
to the attitude determination and control system. They
operate independently, and so the QKD payload is
transferable to other platforms, as long as the spacecraft
bus meets the required pointing and station tracking
accuracy.

Figure 3: Spectrum of expected jitter from ADCS
ground station tracking manoeuver
Conclusions
The detailed feasibility study performed by COM DEV
in partnership with the Institute of Quantum Computing
and in consultation with theInstitut National d’Optique
(INO), UTIAS/SFL, and Neptec have shown that a
microsatellite mission to demonstrate long range QKD
is feasible and practical with current technology. The
implementation of QKD from a satellite would open up
the possibility of long range (global) secure encryption
key distribution that makes use of the fundamental laws
of quantum mechanics rather than relying on the
impracticality of implementating mathematical
algorithms (even on fast computers) to break a key.
Physics prohibits interception of the key without
destroying the information, providing an unprecedented
level of security.

ADCS Requirements
The ADCS requirements imposed by the QKD mission
requirements (amount of quantum key transferred per
unit time) have been shown to be feasible, even in a
microsatellite bus. In particular the University of
Toronto’s Space Flight Lab (UTIAS/SFL) has
performed analysis that demonstrates the feasibility of a
star tracker system to perform the coarse targeting and
tracking of a ground station
The ADCS system of QEYSSat should be able to meet
a pointing accuracy of ±0.3°. Further, simulations
performed by UTIAS/SFL has shown the angular error
jitter to be small (less than a tenth of the overall error),
and has frequency components which are much smaller
(< 1Hz) than the control bandwidth of the APT fine
target tracking controller. Figure 3 shows the expected
tracking jitter from the ADCS.

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the
financial and technical support from the Canadian
Space Agency, and scientific consultations and
recommendations from the Perimeter Institute for
Theoretical Physics, Waterloo, ON

This implies that the acquisition tracking and lock can
be accomplished by the APT to maximize the quantum
link efficiency, using only conventional ADCS pointing
and tracking mechanisms, only with special attention
provided to the optics to maintain the quantum signal.
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